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I.

INTRODUCTION
A.

Summary

Water rights have been subject to considerable change over the
past several decades, and the pace of change is likely to increase.
Water users will be forced to reduce their current diversions,
often by substantial amounts, to protect endangered species, water
quality, or other environmental amenities.

Efforts to eliminate

harmful groundwater mining will force cutbacks in current withdraw
als.

The few hybrid states with significant remaining riparian

rights will at some point try once again to limit their scope.
Pressures for greater public access to waterways will challenge the
asserted right of many holders of surface interests to exclude the
public.

The

one predictable

aspect of water

law's

future

is

change— and publicly mandated change will inevitably invite takings
challenges.
Changes over the last several decades have already brought a
number of takings challenges.

The results of these cases have been

mixed, with water right holders winning only a few.
cases,

however,

activism.

arose

before

federal

courts'

new

takings

Water right holders stand a far better chance today of

invalidating governmental
years ago.

the

Most of these

regulations or changes than just ten

Water cases, however, raise a number of unique issues

1

that make the future results of takings challenges difficult to
predict with certainty.
A particularly interesting issue that has arisen in the water
field is the constitutionality of "judicial takings."

Many of the

changes to water rights over the last decade have been the result
of judicial decisions, and the same is likely to be true in the
future.

This central judicial role raises the question whether

courts are subject to the same constitutional restrictions on the
taking

of

agencies.

private

property

as

legislatures

and

administrative

As I have argued elsewhere, courts should not be exempt

from the constitutional restrictions,

but how the restrictions

should be applied to the courts remains a debated question.

B.

References

Martha Phillips Allbright & Thomas E. Root, Government Takings
of Private Water Rights, 39 R ocky M t n . M i n . L. In s t . 20-1 (1993)
David Hallford, Environmental Regulations as Water Rights
Takings, Natural Resources & Environment , Summer 1991, at 13
John Herbson, Waist Deep in the Big Muddy: Property
Public Values and Instream Waters, 25 Land & W ater L. R e v . 549
(1991)
Dennis J. Herman, Note, Some Times There's Nothing Left to
Give: The Justification for Denying Water Service to New
Customers to Control Growth, 44 St a n . L. Re v . 429 (1992)
• Includes a discussion of takings and other constitu
tional challenges to the refusal of a water agency to
supply water
Jan Laitos, Water
Permitting and the Takings Clause,
(1989)

Rights,
Clean Water
S
60 U. Co l o . L. Re v . 901

Anthony B. Manzanetti, Note, The Fifth Amendment as a Limita
tion on the Public Trust Doctrine in Water Law, 15 Pa c . L.J.
1291 (1984)
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Joseph Sax,
The
C
o
n
s
t
i
u,Property
of Water Law, 61 U. Co l o . L. Re v . 257 (1990)

and the Future

Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Takings and Water
, in Current
T rends and Policies in W ater Law (ABA, forthcoming 1994)

Barton H. Thompson, Jr.,
A Comment on Econo
Just Compensation, 12 In t 'l Re v . L. & Ec o n . 141 (1992)
• Discusses anti-discrimination arguments for the takings
protections, and illustrates with examples involving the
navigational servitude
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Judicial
76 Va . L. Re v . 1449
(1990)
• Argues that the takings protections restrict the power
of courts to change water rights and other property
rights
Joseph L. Sa x , Robert H. A brams , & Barton H. T hompson , Jr ., Legal
Control of W ater Resources (2d ed. 1991)
• Chapter 4 examines takings challenges to changes in
water rights
A. Dan Tarlock , James N. Corbridge , Jr ., & David E. Getches , W ater
Resource M anagement (4th ed. 1993)
• Chapter 3 includes a discussion of takings challenges
to water regulation

II.

A CONCISE BACKGROUND TOUR OF CURRENT TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
A.

Pre-1982: The High Tide of Ad Hoc Balancing

In the 1970s, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
view that there was or could be "any 'set formula' for determining
when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused
by public action be compensated by the government."

Penn Central

Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).

The

Court urged that takings cases must instead be handled as "ad hoc,
factual

inquiries"

in which a number of different

factors are

weighed and balanced, including
• the "economic impact" of the governmental action on the
3

property owner,
• the extent to which the action "has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations" of the owner, and
• the "character" of the action (e.g., does it result in a
"physical invasion" of the property).

B.

1982-Today: A Search for More Crystalline Rules

The United States Supreme Court has not totally abandoned its
ad hoc, balancing approach to determining when there has been a
regulatory taking.

But over the last ten years,

the Court has

tried to add some structure to its jurisprudence— in part by creat
ing several per se categories of takings.

1.

Physical occupations and invasions.
a.

The doctrine

In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982), the Court created its first per

category and,

in the

process, stratified takings analysis according to the character of
the governmental action under attack.

According to Loretto, tak

ings analysis varies dramatically depending on whether a govern
mental regulation results in a "permanent physical occupation" of
property, a "temporary physical invasion" of property, or neither:
• Regulations that result in "permanent physical occupations,"
according to the Court, are essentially the same as governmen
tal condemnations and thus are per se takings.
• Where there is merely a "temporary physical invasion," there
4

is a "governmental invasion of an unusually serious charac
ter," presumably pointing toward a taking, but not necessarily
being a taking; a bit of balancing still must occur.
• Finally, where there is no physical occupation or invasion,
the

Court

indicated

that we're

back

at the

Central

balancing test (and, some of the Court's language suggested,
will seldom find a taking).
Since
on the

t,federal decisions have shed no additional light
e
r
o
L

Supreme

Court's

tenuous

distinction

between

"permanent

physical occupations" and "temporary physical invasions."
courts,

however,

governmental

have

orders

continued

that deprive

to

hold

that

landowners

Federal

virtually

of their

right to

exclude others from their property constitute per se takings.
e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n,
(1987);

483 U.S.

all

825,

Hendlerv. United

See,
831-32

S
t
a
e
s, 952 F.2d 13

(EPA order authorizing access to plaintiffs' property to install
and maintain monitoring well constituted a per se taking).

b.
Because

Limits to the doctrine
of

the

per

se

rule

against

permanent

physical

occupations, attorneys for landowners have diligently tried to fit
every possible regulatory action into the "physical occupation"
category.

In Yee v. City of

,
i 112 S. Ct. 1522
d
n
o
c
s
E

Supreme Court indicated that it would be adopting a quite narrow
definition of physical occupations.

Plaintiffs argued that a city

ordinance imposing below-market rental rates for mobile home pads,
5

when combined with state laws that made it virtually impossible to
evict mobile home tenants,

effectively gave the tenants

a fee

interest in the land and thus constituted a physical taking.

Two

federal circuit courts of appeal had previously agreed with this
argument.

The Supreme Court, however, disagreed (although it left

open

possibility

the

that

the

plaintiffs

could

establish

PennCent

regulatory taking through the

2.

a

Other types of per se intrusions?

According to the Court in Loretto, physical occupations or
invasions constitute particularly serious intrusions into property
rights because a property owner's right to exclude others from her
property is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of
rights that are commonly characterized as property."
433,

quoting Kaiser Aetna v.

(1979).

United States,

458 U.S. at

444 U.S.

164,

176

This logic has raised the question whether there are other

"essential sticks" in a property owner's bundle of rights that are
also categorically protected against governmental regulation.
In Hodel v. Irving,

481 U.S.

704, 716-18

(1987), the Court

strongly suggested that the "right to pass on property" at one's
death is also a core property interest and that any regulation
abolishing that right is a per se taking.
Seattle,
whether

829 P.2d 765,
a challenged

771

(Wash.

regulation

1992)

See also

Inc. v.

(courts must determine

"destroys

one

or more

of

the

fundamental attributes of property ownership— right to possess, to
exclude others, and to dispose of property").
6

3.

Denial of all “economically viable use”

1992

brought

a new per se test:

regulations that deny a

property owner all "economically viable use of his land" require
compensation without any need for case-specific balancing.
v . South

Carolina

Coastal

Council,

112

S.

Ct.

2886

Lucas
(1992).

Although the new "economically viable use" test seems quite narrow
on the surface,

the opinion that announced

it raises numerous

questions and is bound to generate considerable litigation in the
lower courts.

Two questions are likely to be particularly relevant

to takings challenges to various water regulations:
(a) What is the relevant parcel of property in determining
whether the owner has been deprived of "all economically beneficial
use"?

For example, if a property owner buys a piece of property

composed of two adjacent lots and a regulation prevents her from
using one of the lots, has she been deprived of all use of one lot
or only partial use of the entire parcel?

Would it make any

difference if the property were one lot, subdividable into two?
one lot that is not subdividable?

The Supreme Court recognized in

a footnote to its Lucas opinion that this is a difficult question,
but concluded that it did not have to resolve the question since
the Lucas facts did not raise it.
(b) How should courts determine whether the "proscribed use
interests" were part of the landowner's "title to begin with"?
Here the Court provided the most guidance, although the guidance
leaves us with yet other questions.
7

A landowner subject to a total

deprivation

is

entitled

to

compensation

unless

the

challenged

regulation does "no more than duplicate the result that could have
been achieved * * * under the state law of private
nuisance * * * or otherwise."

[or public]

112 S. Ct. at 2900.

In short, the state must show that any economic use to which
the landowner wishes to put his property would be a common law
nuisance (or otherwise banned under the common law) and thus not a
property right to begin with.

And Lucas leaves it quite clear that

state courts cannot uphold regulations simply by asserting without
precedential support that the regulations do nothing that nuisance
law wouldn't have done:
We emphasize that to win its case South Carolina must do
more than proffer * * * the conclusory assertion that
[the uses Lucas desires] violate a common-law maxim such
as sic utere tuo ut alienum non
As we have said,
a 'State, by ipse dixit, may not transform private
property into public property without compensation * *
*." Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449
U.S. 155, 164 (1980). Instead, as it would be required
to do if it sought to restrain Lucas in a common-law
action for public nuisance, South Carolina must identify
background principles of nuisance and property law that
prohibit the uses he now intends in the circumstances in
which the property is presently found.
Id. at 2901.

The Court, moreover,

indicated that courts should

normally look to state nuisance law as it stood before the regula
tion at issue (id.), although "changed circumstances or new know
ledge may make what was previously permissible no longer so" (id.).
Despite this guidance,
questions.

the Court again leaves us with many

Does the Court mean to freeze the state common law of

property and nuisance (except to the extent that applying preexist
ing

legal

rules

to

new

knowledge
8

perhaps

leads

to

different

results)?
opinion.

This is how Justice Stevens interpreted the majority
Id. at 2921 (Stevens, J. , dissenting).

If this is the correct interpretation of Lucas, does the Court
intend to second guess state court determinations of common law in
future takings cases?

The Court has always reserved for itself the

right in takings cases to reconsider a state court's determination
of whether a property right existed.

See Demorest v. City Bank

Farmers Trust, 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944).
Can a property owner challenge a judicial change in property
or nuisance law as a "judicial taking" even when no legislative or
administrative action is involved?
Section V below.

This issue is discussed in

If the Court does not mean to freeze the common

law, however, why should courts have more power than the legisla
ture to change the law to meet evolving needs or views?

C.

Can a Property Owner Challenge a Regulation on the Ground
of Insufficient Governmental Justification?

The Supreme Court developments discussed so far all focus on
the impact of a regulation on the property owner: does the regula
tion strip the property owner of a core interest or eliminate all
the "economically valuable" use of his property?

The Court has

also expressed an increasing interest in the purposes behind the
governmental regulation.
from

recent

decisions

Reading between the lines, one comes away
with

the

distinct

impression

that

some

members of the Court— Justice Scalia in particular— believe that
local and state legislatures and administrative agencies are often
using their "police power" as a screen for unprincipled redistrib
9

utive actions.
Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987), best
embodies

the

Court's

interest

in regulatory purpose.

Quoting

language from prior opinions, the Court emphasized that regulations
are takings if they do not "substantially advance legitimate state
interests."

Id. at 483.

In response to Justice Brennan's sugges

tion that this language simply embodies the minimum rationality
test

of due process

and equal protection,

moreover,

the Court

stressed that the takings test was purposefully higher:
[O ]ur opinions do not establish that [takings] standards
are the same as those applied to due process or equal
protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formula
tions in the takings field have generally been quite
different.
We have required that the regulation "sub
stantially advance" the "legitimate state interest"
sought to be achieved, not that "the State '
ration
ally have decided' that the measure adopted might achieve
the State's objective." * * * [T]here is no reason to
believe * * * that so long as the regulation of property
is at issue the standards for takings challenges, due
process challenges, and equal protection challenges are
identical; any more than there is any reason to believe
that so long as the regulation of speech is at issue the
standards for due process challenges, equal protection
challenges, and First Amendment challenges are identical.
Id. at 834-35 n.3 (citations omitted).
Lower federal and state courts, however, have shown consider
able

reticence

regulations.

about

increasing

their

scrutiny

of

land

use

Most courts have chosen either to distinguish Nollan

on the facts before them or to argue that Nollan really did not
mean to impose a heightened scrutiny on land use regulations.

See,

e.g., Commercial Builders of Northern Cal. v. City of Sacramento,
941 F .2d 872,

874-76

(9th Cir.

1991)

(n
a
l
o
N

does not require

heightened scrutiny) ; Blue Jean Equities West v. City & County of
10

San Francisco,

3 Cal. App.

4th 164, 4 Cal. Rptr.

2d 114

(1992)

( Nollan applies only "to possessory rather than regulatory takings
cases").

III. TAKINGS CLAIMS INVOLVING PRIVATELY HELD WATER RIGHTS
Although Lucas was generally strongly protective of property
rights, dictum in the case suggests that the Court may be willing
to differentiate

rights

and

accord some forms of property less protection than others.

In

particular,

among different types

of property

the Court noted that its takings jurisprudence had

traditionally been guided by the understandings of our citizens
regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle
of rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property,"
and indicated that personal property might be entitled to less
protection than land.

112 S. Ct. at 2879.

This section describes how the courts have historically dealt
with takings challenges to the regulation of privately held water
rights,

and

examines

how

the

courts

might

deal

with

future

challenges.

A.

The Case Law

Numerous attempts to limit or regulate water rights have come
under constitutional attack as "takings."

Until quite recently,

such attacks were no more successful than takings challenges to
zoning

and

successful.

other

regulations

of

real

property— indeed,

less

In recent years, water users have enjoyed a greater
11

level of success, although the road is still steep.

1.

State efforts to abolish or limit riparian rights.

Six

states,

including

Washington,

have

tried

unexercised riparian rights through legislation.

to

abolish

In every state,

riparians challenged the legislation as a taking of their rights.

a.
In all
legislation.

Decisions upholding state legislation
but two

states,

the

state

courts

have

upheld

the

According to the Washington State Supreme Court in

Department of Ecology

v.Abbott, 103 Wash. 2d 6

1077 (1985), it "is well established that riparian rights may be
extinguished or limited by statute."
Co.

See

Power

v.Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555

(9th Cir.

1934),

aff'd, 295 U.S. 142 (1935); Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D.
Kan.

1956),

aff'd,

352

U.S.

863

(1956);

Williams

v.

City

of

Wichita, 190 Kan. 317, 374 P.2d 578 (1962), cert, denied, 375 U.S.
7 (1963); State ex rel. State v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440
(1949); In re Hood River, 114 Or. 112, 227 P. 1065 (1924), appeal
dismissed, 273 U.S. 647 (1926); Belle Fourche Irr. Dist. v. Smiley,
84 S.D. 701, 176 N.W.2d 239 (1970); In re Water Rights of Guadalupe
River Basin, 642 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1982).

b.

California

In California, the court invalidated the legislation not on
takings

grounds

but

because

a
12

1928

constitutional

amendment,

according to the court, expressly protected unused riparian rights.

Irr.Dist.

See Tulare

v.

Lindsay-Strat

489, 45 P.2d 972 (1935) ; see also In re Waters of Long Valley Creek
Stream System, 25 Cal. 3d 339, 158 Cal. Rptr. 350, 599 P.2d 656
(1979)

(distinguishing Tulare in a fashion that suggests the case

is no longer viable law in California).

c.

Oklahoma

Only Oklahoma, in a very recent decision, has held that such
legislation constitutes a taking.

Franco-American Charolaise, Ltd.

v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 855 P.2d 568 (Okla. 1990).
five to four vote,

By a

the Oklahoma Supreme Court invalidated 1963

state legislation limiting future riparian water use to (1) water
used for domestic purposes and (2) any pre-1963 beneficial uses
that

the

riparian

straight forward:

properly

validated.

The

court's

logic was

Riparian rights are private property and thus

protected by the Oklahoma constitution from takings.

The 1963

water code amendments did not simply "restrict" unused riparian
rights, but "took" them "for public use" by permitting appropriators to divert the water.
Franco-American r
epresents an interesting example of how Lucas
might be applied to the water field.

The Oklahoma Supreme Court

essentially took the riparian right and divided it into two parts:
(1)

any currently exercised portion of the right,

and

(2)

the

unused portion of the right which, under the common law, can always
be exercised in the future.

In the court's view, the unused por
13

tion of the right had a unique importance of its own: the "heart of
the riparian right is the right to assert a use at any time."
Having narrowed the relevant water right down to the unexercised
right, the court could conclude that the state had totally stripped
riparians of this right rather than merely "regulating" the right—
and thus had taken riparians' property without compensation.

2.

State and local groundwater regulation.

State courts have quite consistently upheld legislative or
administrative actions limiting the amount of groundwater that can
be extracted from an aquifer— even when the limit is inconsistent
with prior common law groundwater rights.

See, e.g., Peterson

Department of Ecology, 92 Wash. 2d 306, 596 P.2d 285 (1979) ; Aikins
v. Arizona Dept, of Water Resources, 154 Ariz. App. 437, 743 P.2d
946 (1987); Town of Chino v. City of Prescott,

131 Ariz. 78, 638

P.2d 1324 (1981), appeal dismissed, 457 U.S. 1101 (1982); Baeth v.
Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728 (N.D. 1968); Kline v. State, 759 P.2d 210
(Okla. 1988); Knight v. Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 1964).
An exception to the rule highlights the potential importance
to takings claims of the purpose behind the challenged governmental
action.

In McDougal v. County of Imperial, 942 F.2d 668 (9th Cir.

1991), the plaintiffs, who operated a commercial water business in
which they pumped and sold groundwater, and the County of Imperial
had long been involved in a dispute over plaintiffs' sale of water
to farmers across the border in Mexico,

The County had first tried

to directly ban such sales, but the plaintiffs successfully chal
14

lenged the ban in court.

After plaintiffs bought a new well in

1977, the County passed an ordinance which, purportedly to avoid
groundwater overdraft,

required the plaintiffs to stop pumping

water from the well by 1986; in 1984, moreover, the County declared
the property a "floodway," effectively preventing plaintiffs from
developing the property.

When the County refused to lift its ban

on post-1986 pumping except on onerous conditions that plaintiffs
could not meet, plaintiffs sued.
The district court rejected plaintiffs' taking claim on the
ground that the county regulations were designed to advance a
legitimate state interest.

The Court of Appeals, however, reversed

and remanded for consideration of two issues.

First, the Court of

Appeals ordered the lower court to determine whether the public
interest outweighed the severity of the private deprivation.
at 676.

Id.

Second, and of perhaps greater longterm significance, the

Court of Appeals ordered the lower court to consider whether the
county acted out of an illegitimate purpose— in particular,

"to

retaliate against [the plaintiffs] and halt the sale of water to
Mexico."

3.

Id. at 676-77, 679-80.

Other governmental regulations or actions.
a.

Registration of water rights

State courts have rejected state legislation requiring water
right holders

to register their water

otherwise forfeiting the rights).
v.

rights

(at the

cost of

See, e.g., Department of Ecology

Adsit,103 Wash. 2d 698, 694 P.2d 1065, 1069-70 (1985); Matter
15

of Yellowstone River, 253 Mont. 167, 832 P.2d 1210 (1992); see also
Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982)

(upholding the Indiana

Dormant Mineral Act which eliminated severed mineral interests that
the owner did

not use

for

20 years

unless

the

owner

filed

a

statement of claim).

b.

Retroactive application of forfeiture statutes

The Nevada Supreme Court has held that it is not unconstitu
tional for a state to retroactively apply a forfeiture statute.
Town of Eureka v. Office of State Engineer, 108 Nev. 163, 826 P.2d
948, 950-52 (1992).

c.

Requantification of water rights

The Montana

Supreme Court has held that

running afoul of the takings protections,

a state,

without

can take water rights

that are quantified only by diversion rate and requantify them by
both rate and total annual volume.

McDonald v. State, 220 Mont.

519, 722 P.2d 598 (1986).

d.

Use of aquifer storage capacity

The Nebraska Supreme Court has held that the government does
not have to pay compensation for the use of aquifer storage space
underlying private land.

In re Application U-2, 226 Neb. 594, 413

N.W.2d 290, 298-99 (1987).

16

B.

Are Water Rights Subject to
Protection as Rights to Land?

as

Much

Constitutional

1.

Cases holding water rights to be protected property.

In most of the cases upholding water regulations, courts have
relied on the conclusion that the regulations were "reasonable"
restrictions on water rights or legitimate exercises of the state's
"police power."

Virtually every court has recognized that water

rights are property and thus entitled to at least some degree of
constitutional protection.
Adsit, 103 Wash.

2d 698,

See,

e.g, Department of Ecology v.

694 P.2d 1065,

1069-70

(1985); Public

Service Comm'n v. FERC, 754 F.2d 1555, 1564 (10th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1681 (1986); Fallini v.

, 725 F. Supp. 1113,

1123 (D. Nev. 1989), aff'd on other grounds, 963 F.2d 275 (9th Cir.
1992); Town of Eureka v. Office of State Engineer, 108 Nev. 163,
826 P.2d 948, 951 (1992); Hale v. Colorado River Muni. Water Dist.,
818 S.W.2d 537

(Tex.

Ct. App.

1991).

Indeed, most courts have

viewed water rights much like real property for takings purposes,
and have used the same general standards and terminology in takings
challenges to both types of rights.

2.

Cases suggesting less protection for unused water rights.

Some courts and commentators,

however, have suggested that

water rights might be subject to less protection than real proper
ty.

A number of cases, for example, have suggested that unexer

cised riparian or groundwater rights are entitled to virtually no
constitutional protection.

See, e.g., State v. Knapp,
17

167 Kan.

546, 207 P.2d 440, 447 (1949); Baeth v. Hoisveen, 157 N.W.2d 728,
732 (N.D. 1968); In re Hood River, 114 Or. 112, 227 P. 1065, 1094
(1924); Bell Fourche Irr. Dist.

v. Smiley,

204 N.W.2d 105,

107

(S.D. 1973).
This suggestion is not totally unique to water law: a similar
distinction is found in zoning cases where courts readily award
compensation if a zoning ordinance forces an existing use to stop
immediately, but seldom award compensation if the ordinance simply
forecloses a future use.

The presumable logic is that people have

a far greater reliance expectation, and thus compensation claim, in
rights that they are using.

3.

Cases suggesting
generally.

Some

courts

have

also

less

protection

suggested

that

for
there

water
is

rights

something

intrinsically different about water rights that entitle them to
less protection than real property even when the water is actively
being used.

If correct, these opinions will be quite important in

future cases which are far more likely to involve state actions
requiring current water users to reduce their diversions or with
drawals than to involve the limiting of unexercised rights.

a.

Strong public interest in water

One major justification often given for providing less protec
tion to water is that there is a greater public interest in water
than in other property.

Justice Holmes' opinion in Hudson County

Water Co.

209 U.S.

v.

McCarter,

18

349,

356

(1908)

is typically

quoted:
[F]ew public interests are more obvious, indisputable and
independent of particular theory than the interest of the
public of a State to maintain the rivers that are wholly
within it substantially undiminished, except by such
drafts upon them as the guardian of the public welfare
may permit for the purpose of turning them to a more
perfect use. This public interest is omnipresent wher
ever there is a State, and grows more pressing as popula
tion grows.
* * * The private right to appropriate is
subject not only to the rights of lower owners but to the
initial limitation that it may not substantially diminish
one of the great foundations of public welfare and
health.
In this same vein, state courts in many western states have
often pointed to the unique importance of water to the West as a
justification for limiting water rights without paying compensa
tion.

See, e.g., Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617, 625 (D. Kan.

1956), aff'd, 352 U.S. 863 (1956); Baeth

supra, 157

N.W.2d at 733; In re Hood River, supra, 227 P. at 1092-93.
Response:

To the extent that no per se test for a taking is

involved, such considerations may be relevant.
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.

See, e.g., Keystone

DeBenedictus , 480 U.S

(suggesting that courts must consider the benefit of a government
action

in deciding whether the action

is a taking) .

But the

special importance of water should not be emphasized too much, lest
courts forget Justice Holmes' oft quoted warning that "a strong
public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu
tional way of paying for the change."
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.

b.

Usufructuary versus possessory rights

Perhaps the justification given most frequently by courts for
according water rights weaker constitutional protection is that
water users have only usufructuary rather than possessory rights to
water.
Ariz.

See, e.g.,
78,

Townof Chino Valley

638 P.2d 1324,

(1982); Pratt

1328,

appeal dismissed,

457 U.S.

City of
1101

v.State Dept, of Natural Resources, 309 N.

772 (Minn. 1981).
Response:

Other

non-possessory

property

rights

such

as

easements and leases, however, are fully protected by the takings
protection.

The mere fact that water is a usufructuary right thus

is an unconvincing distinction.

c.

Public "ownership" of water rights

Courts wishing to distinguish water from real property also
sometimes emphasize state constitutional or statutory provisions
reciting that water is the property of the public.

See, e.g., F.

Arthur Stone & Sons v. Gibson, 230 Kan. 224, 630 P.2d 1164 (1981);
Pratt
771.

v.State Dept, of Natural Resources,

supra,

309 N.W.2d a

The United States Supreme Court has lent some support to this

argument both in its frequent emphasis on "investment-backed
tations" and by holding that the takings protections do not apply
where a property right is expressly conditioned on the right of the
government to nullify the right.

See,

e.g.,

Dames & Moore v.

Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674 n.6 (1981).
Response:

Nonetheless,

there is something quite troubling
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about this argument standing by itself: can states exempt them
selves

from

the

Constitution's

takings

protections

merely

by

declaring that they are the ultimate "owner" of a resource that,
for all practical purposes, the states treat like a privately owned
resource?

For arguments that the Constitutional protections are

not that easily evaded, see my article on Judicial Takings, 76 V a .
L. Re v . at 1527-30.

Despite various state statutory and constitu

tional provisions stating that water resources ultimately belong to
the state or the public,

states have historically treated water

rights like private property— creating expectations in the holders
of the water rights that should be honored.

d.

Extensive prior regulation

Less troubling as a general proposition is the argument that
states

have

considerable

room

to

regulate

appropriative

water

rights without paying compensation because such rights are subject
ab initio to a variety of broad restrictions.
play,

for example,

There is room for

in the traditional appropriation requirement

that water be used only for a reasonable and beneficial use.

If a

state chooses to require current appropriators to reduce their
diversions to increase instream flows, a state might argue that
prior diversion levels were "unreasonable" and thus not protected
property to begin with.

Lucas' suggestion that personal property

might not be entitled to as much protection

as

land,

because

personal property has been subject to a "traditionally high degree
of [governmental] control," lends some support to this argument.
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See p. 11 supra; 112 S. Ct. at 2879; Broughton Lumber Co. v. United
States,

30 Fed. Cl. 239

(1994)

(denying compensation because of

doubts whether water right holder could use water for hydroelectric
purposes).
Response:

Lucas, however, also suggests that states cannot

escape the takings protections merely by stretching traditional
doctrines to novel lengths.

As discussed earlier, the Court held

that a regulation is not unconstitutional if it merely duplicates
common law restrictions.
could

not

justify

a

But the Court emphasized that a state

regulation

conclusory common law doctrines.

merely

by

invoking

vague

or

The state must point to "existing

rules or understandings" and cannot "by ipse dixit * * * transform
private property into public property without compensation."
the water field,
paying

therefore,

compensation

by

In

states should not be able to elude

reading

new

or

significantly

expanded

meaning into traditional common law doctrines.

C.

Do the Same Takings "Principles11 Apply to Water Cases?

Accepting that water rights are entitled to some degree of
takings

protection,

an

additional

question

is whether

current

takings jurisprudence should be applied, or even can be applied, to
the water context.

Takings jurisprudence was developed to address

land cases, not the quite different resource of water.

Attempts to

apply current takings jurisprudence to water cases, therefore, can
raise difficult issues.
Assume that to protect an endangered species, the government
22

orders a water user to cut her historic water use by half.
a physical taking or a regulatory taking?

Is this

In a property context,

if the government forbids you from building on half your land, the
courts would treat the action as a regulatory taking.

But water is

different from land because your only right is to use the water.
Thus the government order has deprived the water user of all her
legal rights to half her water,

which sounds very much like a

physical taking.
If the court concludes that the government order is not a
physical taking,

does the order fall within any of the per se

takings categories?

Does the action,

for example,

deprive the

water user of an "essential stick" in her bundle of rights?

What

is an "essential stick" might well differ between land and water.
Alternatively, does the action deprive the owner of all economical
ly viable use of her water?

That, of course, depends on how you

define the parcel of water at issue.

IV.

TAKINGS CLAIMS INVOLVING PUBLIC DELIVERY OF WATER
Public delivery of water supplies has generated its own unique

set of takings claims.

In the past, most claims have involved

property owners who were denied water by the local public water
supplier and had no alternative source of water.

Today, attempts

to reform the federal reclamation program by increasing water rates
and reducing water deliveries are provoking a separate wave of
takings challenges.
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A.

Nondelivery bv Public Water Suppliers

The California courts have frequently been confronted by the
question

whether

property

owners

have

any

constitutionally

protected right to receive water from a public water supplier.
Largely in response to anti-growth sentiment, a number of Califorf

nia water suppliers have declared water moratoriums and denied
applications for new or additional service connections.

Property

owners who have needed water in order to develop or use their land,
not surprisingly,

have often responded with challenges based on

takings and other claims.
Until recently, courts uniformly rejected such claims.

The

typical basis was that, under state law, property owners do "not
possess any absolute right to be afforded water service."

Swanson

v. Marin Muni. Water Dist., 56 Cal. App. 3d 512, 128 Cal. Rptr.
485, 491 (1976); see also Hollister Park Inv. Co. v. Goleta County
Water Dist., 82 Cal. App. 3d 290, 147 Cal. Rptr. 91, 93 (1978).
In a recent opinion,

however,

the Ninth Circuit has given

property owners a glimmer of hope that they might be able to raise
a successful constitutional claim.

In Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d

1150 (9th Cir. 1990) , the Court of Appeals— in a prequel to Lucas—
held that a property owner can establish a taking if she can show
that a moratorium prevents "all practical" or "economically viable"
use of her land (defined not to include just looking at or walking
on the land) .

The court also suggested that,

if a district has

been wasting water and has sufficient water to permit additional
hookups, a moratorium might be arbitrary and thus a violation of
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due process or equal protection.

B.

Changes in Federal Reclamation Contracts

Beginning with the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act, Congress has
set out to increase water rates and restrict deliveries to at least
some water users.

In many cases, Congress' changes have clashed

with what water recipients claim to have been their contractual
rights with

the

federal

government.

If the

dispute

involved

alleged state changes to a state contractual obligation,

water

recipients could challenge the action under the Contract Clause of
the federal Constitution, but in one of the peculiarities of the
federal Constitution, the Contract Clause does not apply to the
federal government.

Water recipients, therefore, have been forced

to argue that they have

a property

interest

in their

federal

reclamation contracts and that the government's reform efforts thus
violate the takings protections.
Federal

courts

have

agreed

that

water

recipients

have

a

property interest in their contracts with the federal government,
and that federal abrogation of contractual obligations can violate
the takings protections.

Beyond that, however,

the courts have

held that the federal government must be given substantial leeway
in revisiting reclamation contracts.

According to the courts,

three principles make it very unlikely that reclamation reforms
will constitute takings:
First, "sovereign power, even when unexercised, is an
enduring presence that governs all contracts subject to
the sovereign's jurisdiction, and will remain intact
unless surrendered in unmistakable terms."
Thus,
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"contractual arrangements, including those to which a
sovereign itself is a party, 'remain subject to subse
quent legislation' by the sovereign." Second, governmen
tal contracts "should be construed, if possible, to avoid
foreclosing exercise of sovereign authority."
Third,
governmental contracts should be interpreted against the
backdrop of the legislative scheme that authorized them
* * *.
Peterson
denied,

v.Dept. of Interior,
111

S.

Ct.

555

& 567

899 F.2d 799

(1990) , quoting Bowen

(9th Cir.),
Public

Agencies Opposed to Social Sec. Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41 (1986).
Given this wide latitude, federal courts to date have upheld
Congress' various reform measures.

In Peterson, the Ninth Circuit

upheld the "hammer provisions" of the 1982 Reclamation Reform Act.
More recently, in Madera Irrigation Dist. v. Hancock, the Circuit
Court held that the federal government could impose a higher water
rate

in

a

renewal

contract

in

order

to

recoup

operation

and

maintenance costs that it had not recovered under an initial 40year contract.
In

neither

of

these

cases,

however,

violating a clear contractual obligation.

was

the

government

Where the government

tries to do so (e.g., perhaps by reducing promised water deliver
ies) , the courts will be confronted by a stronger takings claim.

V.

JUDICIAL TAKINGS
As noted in the Introduction, judicial changes to water rights

raise their own unique set of takings issues.

A.

Some Examples

To illustrate the question of judicial takings, consider a few
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examples.

1.

McBrydeSugar

Co.

v.

,
n54
i
b
o
R

(1973).
McBryde begot the longest and best known of the recent judic
ial takings challenges.
appeared

to

radically

In McBryde, the Hawaiian Supreme Court
change

its

state

water

law.

Prior

to

McBryde, Hawaiian judicial decisions suggested that water rights
were both severable and transferable; indeed, agricultural inter
ests spent large sums buying water rights and moving the water to
their fields.

All of this changed with McBryde which held that

water rights could not be sold nor water transported out of its
watershed.
Private water users petitioned for rehearing,
McBryde was an unconstitutional judicial taking.
Supreme Court denied the petition without

arguing that
The Hawaiian

opinion;

two

judges

dissented, agreeing that the court could not impose its vision of
a "better" water rights system on current water users without
compensating users

for their

loss.

55 Haw.

260,

517

P.2d 26

(1973).
The private water users then took their challenge to federal
court, where both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals

held

Robinson
F.2d 1468

that

McBryde

violated

the

takings

protections.

v.Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977), aff'd, 753
(9th Cir.

1985).

The U.

S. Supreme Court,

however,

vacated the Ninth Circuit's decision and remanded for consideration
of whether the takings issue was ripe for review.
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477 U.S. 902

(1986).

On

remand,

the

Ninth

Circuit

ordered

the

complaints

dismissed as premature because the state court had not yet issued
a final order that limited or "interfered in any way with the
parties' use or diversions" of their water.

887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir.

1989).

Town
ofChino Valley v. City of Prescott, 131
638 P. 2d 1324 (1981).

2.

In Chino Valley, the Arizona Supreme Court rejected a takings
challenge by groundwater users to the Arizona Groundwater Manage
ment Act of 1980, partly on the basis that groundwater users did
not own groundwater until they pumped it up for use and that users
were thus not deprived of any property.
In Cherry v. Steiner, 716 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'g 543
F. Supp. 1270 (D. Ariz. 1982), groundwater users challenged
Valley as
decision

itself

an unconstitutional

effectively

groundwater users did own the resource before extraction.

The

federal

the

the

challenge

decisions

that the
that

rejected

older

arguing

holding

courts

reversed

taking,

on

the

ground

that

Arizona Supreme Court had not changed the law; the language from
the older decisions was discarded as mere dictum.
however,

In the process,

the Ninth Circuit expressly recognized that a judicial

change in water law could violate the takings protections.

3.

National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d
419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709 (1983).

Although the California Supreme Court in its Mono Lake decis
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ion unanimously held that the public trust doctrine applied to and
limited

appropriations

affecting

navigable

waterways,

many

California water lawyers and water users believed that the decision
was a sharp and unjustifiable change in the law.
for certiorari,

In its petition

the City of Los Angeles tried to emphasize the

extent of the change and argued that the Mono Lake decision was an
unconstitutional judicial taking.
petition without comment.

4.

The Supreme Court denied the

464 U.S. 977 (1983).

Bott v. Michigan Dept, of Natural
45, 327 N.W.2d 838 (1982).

415 M ich.

Various interests urged the Michigan Supreme Court in Bott to
expand the public's right to use Michigan waterways by rejecting
the state's traditional "log-flotation" test in favor of a "recre
ational-boating" test.

The court refused, largely because such a

change would deprive many riparians of "a property right without
compensation."

The court did not expressly hold that a change in

the test would constitute a judicial taking, resting its refusal to
change the law simply on the "unfairness of eliminating a property
right without compensation."
Where other state courts have expanded the public's right to
use

waterways,

certiorari

riparians

from the U.S.

have

sometimes

unsuccessfully

sought

Supreme Court on the ground that the

expansion was a judicial taking.

See, e.g., State v. McIlroy, 268

Ark. 227, 595 S.W.2d 659, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980).
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B.

Arguments For and Against Subjecting Judicial Decisions
to the Takings Protections

1.

Arguments for restricting judicial takings.

Strong arguments can be made in favor of subjecting judicial
decisions to the federal takings protections.

The language of the

Fifth Amendment does not distinguish among the various branches of
government.

And

the

Fourteenth

Amendment,

which

extends

the

takings protections to the states, is applied to judicial decisions
in numerous other contexts.

See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer,

334

U.S. 1, 16-18 (1948) (racial discrimination); Cantwell v. Connecti
cut,

310

U.S.

296

(1940)

(freedom

of

speech).

consequences to the property owner of a change
moreover,

The

adverse

in her rights,

is exactly the same whether the change is made by the

legislature, an administrative agency, or a court.
The arguments in favor of subjecting judicial decisions to the
same

constitutional

regulations

are

restrictions

laid

out

at

as

greater

legislative
length

and

in my

executive
article

on

Judicial Takings, 76 V a . L. Re v . 1449 (1990) .

2.

Arguments against restricting judicial takings.

At least three policy arguments can be made against subjecting
judicial decisions to the takings protections,

although none is

ultimately convincing.

a.
The

"Courts are more trustworthy.”

first argument

looks at the possible

reasons

why the

Constitution requires legislatures to pay compensation and asks
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whether the reasons apply equally to the courts.

A number of

judges and academics believe that we require legislatures to pay
compensation because of imperfections in the legislative process:
legislatures

(1) reshuffle property rights often in response to

naked majoritarian pressure (rather than for the "common good"),
(2) frequently discriminate among property owners in condemning and
regulating property, and (3) will treat property as "free" if they
don't have to pay for it.

The takings protections help remedy some

of these flaws and compensate property holders who are victims of
the other flaws.

Many of these same judges and academics believe

that courts are not subject to the same flaws as legislatures are
and that compensation is therefore unnecessary when courts reshuf
fle property rights.
Responses:

More traditional arguments for the takings protec

tions, however,

do not depend on the existence of political or

governmental imperfections.
ment has

All that matters is that the govern

involuntarily expropriated a person's property or,

by

taking property without compensation, forced the owner to bear an
unjustifiably large portion of societal costs.
elsewhere,

moreover,

As I have argued

state courts suffer from many of the same

political imperfections as legislatures (albeit to a lesser degree
in some cases).

b.

76 V a . L. Re v . at 1482-98.

"Courts need to change the law."

Some have also objected that, if the takings protections are
applied to judicial decisions, courts will not be able to change
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property law in response to evolving societal needs.

Legislatures

have a choice under the takings protections: they can take property
and compensate, or not take the property.

Because courts do not

have treasuries of their own, however, most judges and lawyers have
assumed that courts would not have a similar option.

If a judicial

change would take property, the courts could not make the change.
Responses:

To begin, the takings protections apply only to a

narrow set of actions; most changes in property law would not be
considered "takings."
over,

As discussed later in this outline, more

state courts might well be able to find a way to provide

compensation if they wished to make a change that would be consid
ered a taking.

Even if they could not, the legislature would still

be free to institute the change.
don't have their own treasury.

Administrative agencies also

And although legislatures theoreti

cally can pay compensation, they often do not have the wherewithal
to

pursue

holders.

a change

if

ordered

to

compensate

injured

property

(For a more extensive treatment of these issues, see my

article at 76 V a . L. Re v . 1499-1509.)

c.

Concerns over federalism.

Some judges and lawyers have also argued that the development
of property law is a matter for the states, and that federal courts
should not interfere with this

local

function by applying the

takings protections to state property decisions.
Responses:

Federalism arguments, however, apply equally to

all the branches of state government.
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Yet the courts have never

held state legislatures and administrative bodies to a lower stan
dard under the takings protections than they have held the federal
government.

See 76 Va. L. Rev. at 1509-11.

C.

Case Lav

1.

Supreme Court precedent.

The Supreme Court's view of judicial takings has fluctuated
widely over time and never been entirely clear.

a.

Do the takings protections apply?

In the first case to hold that states were subject to the
federal takings protections, the Court also held that the takings
protections applied to the courts.
R.R. v. City of Chicago,

166 U.S.

Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
226, 233-35

(1897).

But the

issue in the case was only whether a state court violated the
takings protections by awarding one dollar for a legislative taking
of property worth far more; the Court did not address the question
whether a change in judicial law could constitute a taking.
In Muhlker v. New York & Harlem Railroad, 197 U.S. 544, 570-71
(1905) , however, a 4-justice plurality held that the New York Court
of

Appeal

had

unconstitutionally

taken

someone's

property

by

abandoning prior precedents.
In the 1930s, the Court seemed to reject this position and,
although not directly addressing a judicial takings claim, held
that courts could "ordinarily overrule their own decisions without
offending constitutional guaranties."
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See Great Northern Ry.

.
v

Sunburst

Oil& Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364-65 (1932);r
e
k
n
i
B

hoff-Faris Trust

& Savings

Co.

v. H i l l , 281 U.S.

673,

680-81

(1930).
Justice Potter Stewart revived the idea of judicial takings in
Hughes v. Washington,

389 U.S. 290

(1967), where he argued in a

concurring opinion that the fourteenth amendment forbids a state
from taking property without compensation "no less through its
courts than through its legislature."

According to Stewart,

a

state decision does not contravene the Constitution if the decision
"arguably conforms to reasonable expectations."

But a decision is

unconstitutional "to the extent that it constitutes a sudden change
in state law, unpredictable in terms of the relevant precedents."
The Court as a whole has not addressed the judicial takings
issue

in the

last

several

decades,

although

the

Court

quoted

Stewart's concurrence with apparent agreement in Bonelli Cattle Co.
v. Arizona,

414 U.S.

313,

331

(1973).

(Bonelli,

however,

was

itself overruled on other grounds in Oregon v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).)

b.

When is a judicial decision a "taking"?

Assuming courts are subject to the takings protections, the
appropriate test for determining whether there has been a judicial
taking

is unclear.

A

judicial

decision

presumably would

not

constitute a taking if an identical legislative or administrative
action would not be a taking.
in Hughes,

however,

Justice Stewart's concurring opinion

suggests that
34

courts

should have

somewhat

greater

constitutional

leeway

to

change

property

rights

than

legislatures and administrative agencies are given: only "sudden”
and "unpredictable" shifts in the law would be unconstitutional.
Related Supreme Court opinions similarly suggest that state court
decisions are valid if there is "fair support" or a "fair and
substantial basis" for the decisions.
Bank Farmers

2.

See, e.g., Demorest v.y
t
i
C

Trust,321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944).

Lower court precedent.
a.

Lower federal court precedent

Since Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes,

two federal

courts have held state decisions to be unconstitutional takings.
See Robinson v.
F. Supp. 473

i
h
s
o
y
r
A
, supra; Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, 460

(D. Haw.

1978)

(involving a change in the dividing

line between public and private beach).
Several other courts have recognized that a judicial decision
might violate the takings protections, but have either held there
was no taking on the

facts presented or declined to hear the

dispute on jurisdictional grounds.

See, e.g., Cherry v. Steiner,

716 F.2d 687, 692 (9th Cir. 1983) (no change in the law); Reynolds
v. Georgia, 640 F.2d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1981)

(no jurisdiction);

Hay v. Bruno, 344 F. Supp. 286, 289 (D. Or. 1972) (no unpredictable
change).

b.

State court precedent

A number of state courts have also declined to overrule prior
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precedents on the ground that to do so might be unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Dolphin Lane

Assocs. v. Town of Sout

868, 339 N.Y.S.2d 966, 975 (1971); State

Corvallis Sand & Gravel

Co., 283 Or. 147, 582 P.2d 1352, 1363 (1977).
Several state courts have also held that judicial changes to
property rights can violate the takings clause, but concluded that
their

holdings

property regime.

did

not

constitute

changes

in

the

established

See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Berk, 26 Cal.

3d 201, 212-15, 161 Cal. Rptr. 742, 749-51, 605 P.2d 381, 388-90
(1980); Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Servs., 86 111. 2d 1, 36-37,
426 N.E.2d 824, 841 (1981).

D.

Practical and Jurisdictional Issues

Although there are strong arguments, and some precedent,

in

favor of applying the takings protections to judicial decisions,
both practical and jurisdictional problems are likely to limit the
degree to which federal courts actively police judicial changes in
state property or water law.

The most valuable use of the judicial

takings doctrine may be in influencing the actions of state courts.

1.

United States Supreme Court Review.

Where a state court abandons its prior precedents and narrows
or eliminates the property or water right of a party before it, the
party can petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari.
The Court, however, has shown no interest in granting petitions
that raise judicial takings claims.
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The Court's disinterest is

unlikely to change for several reasons.

a.

Worries about becoming enmeshed in state law

First, most state courts generally distinguish

(or ignore)

prior precedents in changing property or water rights; far from
expressly

abandoning

the

prior

precedents,

state

generally claim that the law has not changed.

courts

will

To hold that the

state court has "taken" property, the Supreme Court would therefore
need to immerse itself in the local law and conclude that the state
court misinterpreted its own prior cases.

For obvious reasons, the

Supreme Court would prefer not to invest time becoming expert on
local issues nor to cast aspersions on local courts.

b.

Desire to maintain own flexibility

Second, the Court is almost certainly wary of the potential
consequences of a judicial takings doctrine for its own flexibil
ity.

The Court itself has changed property and water rights in the

past.

Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, 429 U.S. 363 (1977), for

example, explicitly overruled Bonelli Cattle Co. v. Arizona, 414
U.S.

313

(1973)

and

thus

reallocated

to

the

State

of

Oregon

property that under Bonelli would have belonged to a private party.
The Court will want to continue to keep its options open in the
future.

c.
Finally,

Worries about the potential flood of petitions
the Court may be concerned about an
37

increase

in

certiorari petitions if it were to reverse a state court decision
as a judicial taking.

Anyone who loses a property case in state

court would then be tempted to argue that the court "changed" the
law (i.e., ignored the litigant's arguments based on prior case law
and precedents) and thus violated the takings protections.

Given

the indeterminacy in many areas of property law, most of these
claims will be at least superficially plausible and difficult to
reject out of hand.

2.

Lower Federal Court Review.
a.

Direct review of state court decisions

Unable to obtain Supreme Court review,

a property owner or

water right holder who has been injured by a state decision might
try filing a lawsuit in federal district court challenging the
constitutionality of the decision.

Such a lawsuit, however,

is

likely to run into serious jurisdictional problems.

i.

Ripeness and prematurity

As the water users in Robinson discovered, judicial takings
challenges can run into prematurity problems.

As noted at pages

27-28, the Ninth Circuit on remand in Robinson held that the water
users could not prosecute their judicial takings claim because the
Hawaiian courts had not issued a final order that precluded the
users from continuing to use their water rights as before.
son v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989).
court order expressly

Robin

Unless there is a

limiting use of one's property or water
38

rights, therefore, any challenge to a state decision is likely to
be dismissed as premature.

ii.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

A far more serious jurisdictional obstacle is presented by the
R o o k e r - F e l d m a n doctrine.

In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S

413 (1923), plaintiffs who lost in state court brought a separate
action in federal district court arguing that the state decision
had changed the law in violation of the due process clause.

The

Supreme Court held that district courts do not have jurisdiction to
review alleged constitutional

flaws

in state decisions because

appellate jurisdiction over state decisions lies exclusively in the
Supreme

Court.

In District

of Columbia

Court

of Appeals

v.

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), the Supreme Court reaffirmed Rooker
and observed that district courts cannot entertain "horizontal"
challenges to state court decisions even on constitutional claims
that were not raised in the state court.
Although

the

Rooker-Feldman

doctrine

would

seem

to

bar

district court review of judicial takings claims, the Ninth Circuit
has narrowly interpreted the doctrine.

In Robinson v. Ariyoshi,

supra, the Ninth Circuit held that Rooker-Feldman does not apply
where

a property holder

raises

a judicial

takings

claim

in a

petition for rehearing of the offending state decision and the
state court then fails to consider and decide the issue.
at 1471-73.

753 F.2d

The Ninth Circuit would presumably also hold that the

doctrine does not apply in any situation where the property holder
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is not given an effective opportunity to raise a judicial takings
claim in the state court.
The Fifth Circuit,

by contrast,

has expressly rejected the

Ninth Circuit view and applies Rooker-Feldman broadly to bar all
collateral

attacks

Reynolds v.

on

alleged

judicial

takings.

See,

e.g.,

,
a
i
g
r
o
e
G 640 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1981).

b.

Incidental review of state court decisions.

A property holder who was not party to the offending state
decision but who is affected by the decision may be able to obtain
federal

review

if non-judicial

state

action

is also

involved.

Where a property holder challenges legislative or administrative
action as a taking and a defense is that the plaintiff did not have
any property right to take, federal courts are free to decide the
property question for themselves even though a state court has held
that the claimed property right did not exist.

See, e.g., Demorest

v. City Bank Farmers Trust, 321 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1944).
As noted at page 28, for example, groundwater users were able
to raise a federal challenge to the Arizona supreme court's decis
ion in Chino Valley even though the state court had already consid
ered and rejected the claim that its decision violated the takings
protections.

The groundwater users were able to bring the federal

action because they were not technically challenging the Arizona
Groundwater Management Act of 1980 and were not parties to the
Chino Valley action.

40

3.

Relevance to state court proceedings.

Because of the problems with federal review, judicial takings
arguments might be most effectively used in urging state courts not
to change the law to begin with.

As previously noted, a number of

courts have declined to modify their states' property or water law
because of the argument that the modification would violate the
takings protections.
In this regard, return for a moment to an earlier question:
given that state courts don't have their own treasury, is there any
way that they can make a change that would be a taking?

Or must

they leave any change to the legislature?
A reasonable argument can be made that courts have the power
to change

the

law and order the

state to compensate property

holders for the change— although courts, for obvious reasons, are
unlikely to exercise the power.

Alternatively,

a court could

change the law contingent on the legislature authorizing compensa
tion within a set period of time;
authorize compensation,

if the legislature does not

the decision would not take effect.

A

court, for example, might order a water user to reduce its diver
sions in light of the public trust, but only if the state agrees to
pay compensation to the user.
This latter approach is not as far fetched as it might seem at
first glance.

California courts, for example, have generally held

that the state must pay compensation if, in asserting the public
trust, it appropriates or destroys improvements built by a private
owner on trust lands.

See, e.g., State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.
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3d 240, 249, 625 P.2d 256, 261, 172 Cal. Rptr. 713, 719 (1981).

VI.

CONCLUSION
Over

the

next

decade,

water

law

is

likely

significant battlefield in the war over "takings."

to

become

a

Unfortunately,

water cases are also likely to add new complexities and puzzles to
a jurisprudence which is already murky with uncertainty.
not

mean

that

courts

should

avoid

tackling

the

This does

issues.

The

constitutional protections against takings remain important for
many reasons and call out for enforcement.
the courts, however, will seldom be easy.
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The cases that confront

